Xi’s Intimidation and the Limits of Chinese Power
Xi’s intimidation campaign has been effective so far, but the nation he leads is not actually a peer power.
That sentence cuts to the heart of a recurring argument among conservative strategists: Beijing can bully, but it cannot match the United States on every front. Intimidation works where others hesitate, but coercion is not the same as sustained, systemic strength.
China exercises leverage through trade dependencies, strategic investments, and gray-zone military moves that fall short of outright war. Those tools can reshape local decisions and intimidate smaller neighbors, yet they also expose Beijing to countermeasures and long-term economic friction. Intimidation is a tactic, not an enduring foundation for global leadership.
On economics, China is giant in headline statistics but fragile in critical areas. Its growth model depends on exports, foreign technology, and heavy borrowing, and those dependencies create vulnerabilities the United States and allies can exploit. A nation that must import chips, advanced machinery, and certain raw materials has limits on strategic autonomy.
Demographics and productivity trends compound the problem for Beijing. An aging workforce and declining birthrates strain public finances and productivity, while a state-led industrial policy often slows innovation rather than speeding it. Authoritarian control can concentrate power quickly but cannot easily replace the messy, creative dynamics of free enterprise.
Militarily, China has modernized rapidly, investing in missiles, ships, and cyber capabilities designed to complicate American plans in a regional conflict. Yet power projection beyond the immediate neighborhood remains costly and uncertain. The logistical and allied-network advantages of the United States still matter in any serious contest of arms.
Beijing also relies on intimidation to shape narratives and to deter Western support for democratic partners. That soft coercion plays well at home and in some international forums, but it breaks down under coordinated pressure. Democracies working together can blunt influence campaigns and raise the costs of aggression.
Xi Jinping has consolidated authority to an unprecedented degree within the Chinese Communist Party, and that centralization helps implement bold drives. But personalization of power comes with tradeoffs: policy errors are harder to correct, and risk-taking can escalate quickly into miscalculation. A system that suppresses dissent may look stable until it does not.
A Republican perspective stresses clear-eyed deterrence and competitive renewal rather than wishful engagement. Strength in defense, resilience in supply chains, and targeted export controls reduce the effectiveness of coercion. The goal is to make intimidation expensive and unattractive to Beijing.
Strength also means economic independence where it matters, including on critical minerals, semiconductors, and energy. Rebuilding manufacturing and secure supply chains with friendly partners undercuts leverage that relies on short-term commercial convenience. Policies that reward onshore capacity and trusted allies improve national security.
Diplomacy should layer alliances, support Taiwan’s self-defense, and hold a united line on principles like freedom of navigation. Standing with democracies and leveraging economic tools can counterbalance intimidation without inviting unnecessary escalation. A calibrated blend of firmness and alliance-building is more effective than unilateral accommodation.
Information campaigns and defenses against digital coercion are part of the toolbox that neutralizes Beijing’s softer tactics. Democracies must expose economic coercion and propaganda while protecting legitimate technological exchange. Transparency and resilience reduce the returns on intimidation.
In short, intimidation has real effects, and conservatives should not ignore them, but the underlying capacity for global leadership requires more than bluster and regional pressure. Practical reforms at home, strategic partnerships, and credible military deterrence together blunt coercion and preserve a rules-based order. The aim should be sustainable advantage, not simply matching every move China makes.