Overrule the 1935 Precedent and Restore Presidential Control of the Executive
The 1935 precedent that insulated certain officials from presidential removal has warped accountability across the federal government. It created layers of agency power that answer more to commissions and lifetime protections than to the voters who elect a president. Republicans argue this conflicts with the Constitution’s design of a single, responsible executive who enforces the law.
When presidents cannot remove officials who block policy, the executive branch becomes a maze of veto points rather than a tool of governance. That reality encourages agency capture, where career bureaucrats or special interests set policy through procedure rather than law. Restoring removal authority brings decisions back to elected leaders who must answer at the ballot box.
Article II places the executive power with the president, and that means responsibility for enforcement and administration. A president who cannot hire and fire accountable subordinates cannot take responsibility for how laws are executed. Overruling the 1935 decision would clarify that elected officials, not insulated boards, should be the ones implementing national priorities.
Practical results follow from legal structure: when the president controls executive leadership, policy is coherent and responsive. Without that control, agencies drift and produce confusing, often contradictory directives that harm businesses and citizens. Republicans maintain that predictable, accountable enforcement promotes economic growth and respects the rule of law.
Critics say independent agencies protect expertise and reduce political swings, but those protections often shield unelected power instead of improving governance. Expertise matters, but accountability cannot be optional. Ensuring that agency leaders are removable for cause or at-will ties expertise to public responsibility rather than insulating it from democratic correction.
Judges have a role in correcting constitutional drift, and revisiting precedents that undercut separation of powers is a legitimate judicial task. Overruling a flawed 1935 decision would not upend regulation overnight, it would rebalance who answers for enforcement choices. The courts can set bright lines so both presidents and Congress know where authority begins and ends.
Congress retains tools to frame agency structure and limit abuses without surrendering the president’s core executive power. Statutes can define tenure, create transparency requirements, and preserve expertise while allowing removal where necessary for accountability. The preferable path is a legal framework that respects both democratic control and administrative competence.
In short, restoring presidential control over execution of the law is about responsibility, not politics. It makes elected leaders answerable for outcomes and curbs a permanent bureaucracy that operates beyond electoral consequence. Republicans see overturning the 1935 precedent as a step toward a clearer, more accountable federal government.