Why the National Security Strategy Won’t Keep Americans Safer
The administration’s National Security Strategy document promises big ideas, but it does not make Americans safer in its current form. It leans heavily on optimism about diplomacy and partnerships while downplaying the hard choices that actually deter adversaries. That gap matters because deterrence is built on capability and credibility, not on wishful thinking.
The strategy reads like a hope-for-the-best plan when great power competition is getting sharper. China, Russia and Iran are not pausing to admire policy papers; they react to power, posture and consequences. When a strategy softens the posture without matching it to stronger tools, rivals test limits and American lives and interests become more exposed.
Too much of the document treats alliances as substitutes for domestic strength instead of complements to it. Allies are crucial, but expecting partners to carry risks while the United States trims forces or ignores homeland vulnerabilities is backward. Robust alliances only work when the U.S. can show it will act decisively if deterrence fails.
Border security and domestic resilience barely get the priority they need, and that invites problems at home. Open seams mean easier transit for illicit goods, extremists and illicit funding that feed transnational threats. A credible national security strategy ties homeland defense to foreign policy, not the other way around.
Economic tools get mentioned, but the plan understates the role of energy independence and industrial strength as national security priorities. Cutting off leverage by weakening the energy sector or supply chains removes bargaining chips we need against coercive actors. Strength is also built in factories and ports, and that needs a clearer place in strategy discussions.
Cyber and critical infrastructure threats are treated like side notes instead of crisis-level priorities. Adversaries attack networks and pipelines because those strikes cause disruption at low cost and with plausible deniability. A Republican view insists we harden systems, partner with the private sector, and accept that some defenses must be more aggressive to deter attacks.
Military readiness and modernization get lip service while procurement timelines and funding profiles lag behind the threats. If deterrence depends on aging platforms and hollow units, then strategy is a paper tiger. Investments in missile defense, logistics and rapid surge capacity are not optional if we want to change adversary calculations.
Burden-sharing with allies needs teeth, not gentle nudges, and red lines must be clear. Allies should pay up and meet capability targets because free rides erode coalition credibility. Clear consequences for violations and transparent thresholds for action reduce the chance of miscalculation and keep conflicts from escalating by accident.
Intelligence, special operations and pragmatic counterterrorism deserve sharper focus than open-ended nation-building. Targeted pressure, swift countermeasures and relentless enforcement of sanctions create predictable consequences for bad actors. Congress and the executive branch must align budgets and authorities so strategy becomes more than an essay and instead produces results that actually protect Americans.